We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with (possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, 'contraction consistency', subsumes earlier notions such as Chernoff's Condition, Sen's α and β, and regularity. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice correspondence, under which contraction consistency is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preference in its most general form. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for such equivalence. Analogous domain restrictions are also identified for the special case where choice is deterministic but possibly multi-valued. Results due to Sen (Rev Econ Stud 38: 307-317, 1971) 
Introduction
The revealed preference approach to the general theory of choice seeks to: (i) offer intuitively plausible a priori consistency postulates as axiomatic foundations for choice behaviour, and (ii) deduce the logical implications of such consistency postulates in specific analytical contexts. The natural starting point for developing a notion of consistent choice would appear to be the context of 'set contraction'. Suppose, starting from some initial choice situation, i.e., some collection of alternatives that are available to the decision-maker, the feasible set contracts, in that some alternatives become unavailable. What kind of choice behaviour in the new situation should be deemed 'reasonable', in the sense of being intuitively consistent with choice in the initial situation?
The basic answer offered appears to be: alternatives initially chosen should not be rejected because other alternatives have been eliminated. The exact form this intuitive answer takes however varies. Under the assumption that a single, unique, alternative is picked from each feasible set, so that choice behaviour is represented via deterministic choice functions (DCFs), Chernoff (1954) required the alternative initially chosen to continue to be chosen in the new situation, unless eliminated by the contraction of the feasible set. The condition of 'regularity' generalizes this formulation to the context of stochastic choice functions (SCFs); i.e., to contexts where a single alternative is picked from a given feasible set, but exactly which alternative is chosen is determined according to some probabilistic rule. Regularity requires the probability, of the chosen alternative lying in some collection , not to fall when the feasible set contracts from Sen (1969) considered the parallel generalization of DCFs to deterministic choice correspondences (DCCs), which permit multiple alternatives to be chosen from a feasible set, but only in a non-probabilistic fashion.
1 His α and β conditions together require the following. Suppose some subset of alternatives, say C , is chosen from the initial feasible set A . Then, assuming not every member of is eliminated by the contraction of the feasible set to C B , the choice set from B should consist of all surviving members of C .
2 Nandeibam (2003) has offered a probabilistic version of this condition, which he terms regularity, in the context of a finite universal set of alternatives.
1 What we term a 'choice function' is often also referred to in the literature as an 'element-valued choice function', to demarcate it from our 'choice correspondence', which is termed a 'set-valued choice function'. . Thus, C y ∈ β can be equivalently stated as: the choice set of B must be some subset of C , unless the intersection of the choice set of B I B with C is empty. Consequently, , the two conditions together require the choice set of B to be exactly when is non-empty. While B C I B C I β is often termed 'expansion consistency', and the name 'contraction consistency' reserved for α , it is evident from the above formulation that β can also be equivalently interpreted as a consistency restriction on choice from a contracted feasible set, distinct from α . We shall accordingly interpret both α and β as separate consistency restrictions on choice from a contracted feasible set.
Probabilistic choice and choice of multiple alternatives have both featured extensively, but usually independently, in the literature. 3 In the context of individual decision-making, it is widely recognized that random preferences and preferences that generate multiple best alternatives appear independently plausible on intuitive, as well as empirical, grounds. Furthermore, in many theoretical contexts, it is helpful to represent an aggregation of individual, deterministic, choice correspondences by means of a probability distribution. 4 Thus, a unified framework that simultaneously permits the choice counterparts of both these properties, by means of stochastic choice correspondences (SCCs), is of considerable interest. Within this unified framework, how should one interpret the notion of choosing consistently when the feasible set contracts? Since most choice problems in economic contexts involve universal sets that are infinite, the condition of regularity in Nandeibam (2003) needs to be suitably expanded. The first purpose of this paper is to offer such an expansion.
Our second, more substantive, purpose is to advance this notion of 'contraction consistent' choice as the axiomatic foundation for a general revealed preference theory. This necessitates an additional step. Our interpretation should suffice to generate choice restrictions across two feasible sets, neither of which includes the other. Versions of the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP), designed for DCFs, DCCs and SCFs, have been developed explicitly to cover such cases.
Predictive implications of the standard theory in alternative analytical contexts are typically deduced from corresponding versions of the weak axiom, whether singly or in conjunction with other conditions. Our notion of contraction consistent choice in the general context of SCCs should therefore imply a correspondingly expanded version of WARP, which subsumes all earlier, restrictive, versions. Accordingly, we offer a version of the weak axiom, expanded to cover SCCs, which is shown to follow from our notion of contraction consistency, under reasonable domain restrictions.
Analogous exercises were performed by Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) in the context of SCFs, and by Sen (1971) in the context of DCCs. The analysis in the present paper, carried out in the completely general context of SCCs, thus subsumes, integrates and supersedes these earlier findings.
Section 2 formalizes the idea of representing choice behaviour via SCCs. We introduce our two consistency postulates for SCCs, viz. contraction consistency (NC) and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP), in section 3. Our NC expands Nandeibam's (2003) notion of regularity to permit universal sets which are not-necessarily finite, whereas our WASRP expands 3 Recent examples of the literature on probabilistic choice include Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2004 , 2002 , 1999 , Barbera and Pattanaik (1986) , Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2008 , 2007 ), McCausland (2009 ), McFadden (2005 and Nandeibam (2009) . Dasgupta (2009) develops a stochastic theory of competitive firm behaviour. Contributions in the DCC framework include Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) in the general choice context, and Richter (1966) , Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) in the specific context of consumers' demand. 4 For example, Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2002) discuss how, in the context of consumers' choice, the analytical construct of a stochastic demand function may usefully be deployed to provide the aggregate representation of a collection of individual, deterministic, demand functions. Dasgupta (2009) provides a supply theoretic analogue. The literature on collective choice has analyzed at length the implications the version in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) to permit multi-valued choice. In section 3, we also clarify how our two consistency postulates subsume and unify various analogous notions available in the literature. The relationship between the two postulates is discussed in section 4. While WASRP necessarily implies NC, if the SCC is not defined for some subsets of the universal set of alternatives, 5 it can violate WASRP while satisfying NC. We identify a restriction on the domain of the SCC under which the two conditions are equivalent. This restriction permits the domain to be 'incomplete', i.e., not defined for some subsets of the universal set. Our domain restriction also happens to be necessary for NC to imply WASRP, when the universal set is finite 6 . We then provide a domain restriction which suffices for NC to imply WASRP, for the special case of DDCs, i.e., of degenerate SCCs. As before, this restriction also turns out to be necessary when the universal set is finite. Lastly, we clarify how Sen's (1971) result regarding the equivalence between the co bination of his m α and β conditions and WARP for DCCs, and the key findings of Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) , all follow as special cases of our general analysis. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated the appendix. to
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An SCC is singular when the probability of choosing a non-singleton set is zero. It is degenerate when choice is, in effect, deterministic. An SCC is singular and degenerate when exactly one alternative is picked, that too in a deterministic fashion. We shall identify a singular SCC with an CF, a deg CC and S enerate S with a DCC, and a singular degenerate SCC with a DCF. 
Contraction consistency and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference
We now in duce our two rationality , tro , or consistency
and for all non-empty
(3.1) et Consider some initial feasible s Z A ∈ , and some A B ⊆ , Z B ∈ . Let C be an arbitrary (nonpty) collection of subsets of em B . Consider the probability of choosing a subset whose overlap with B happens to be a member of C . Intuitively, it seems reasonable to argue that this probability should not fall when the feasible set is reduced from A to B , since such a move only eliminates alternatives outside B . This is the requirement imposed by our contraction consistency.
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In the special case of a finite universal set of alternatives, our NC is equivalent to the version of regularity provided by Nandeibam (2003) . We proceed to clarify how our NC relates to earlier, logous, re h finitions 2. ply the following. ana strictions in t e literature. De 2 and 3.1 im
such that A B ⊆ , and for all non-
, and for all
and .
ta a
When choice is confined to singleton subsets of alternatives, Observation 3.2(i) implies NC is equivalent to the condition of regularity specified in the literature with regard to SCFs (e.g. Nandeibam, 2008 Nandeibam, , 1996 Pat naik nd Peleg, 1986 ( )
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Observation 3.4 clarifies how our WASRP integrates and subsumes earlier versions of the weak axiom. Our WASRP, when confined to singular SCCs, becomes equivalent to WASRP for SCFs, introduced by Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) hosen alterna ve either lying in that subset or being unavailable under A . When confined to degenerate SCCs, our WASRP is equivalent to WARP for DCCs (Arrow, 1959; Sen 1971 
Results
We are now ready to characterize the relationship between our two consistency restrictions on SCCs, viz. contraction consistency and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference. We first introduce some notation, before proceeding to present and discuss our central results. 
An SCC over Z satisfies NC if it satisfies WASRP.
(ii)
An SCC over Z satisfying NC also satisfies WASRP when ℑ ∈ Z .
Proof: See the Appendix. Recall now that, when the SCC is constrained to be singular, the restrictions imposed by our NC and WASRP turn out to be equivalent, respectively, to those imposed on an SCF by the condition of regularity and the version of WASRP advanced by Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) . Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) show that, for SCFs, their version of WASRP implies regularity, while the converse also holds when the domain of the SCF is restricted to the class ℑ . X ℑ , the class Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) show that, given a finite provides a domain restriction that is both necessary and sufficient for Chernoff's Condition to imply WARP for DCFs.
In 
Evidently, any such domain (including, obviously, the complete domain) must belong to our class ℑ ; additionally, there may exist domains which belong to but fall outside the class identified by Sen.
Î
14 Thus, our Proposition 13 Sen (1971) formally states his equivalence result under the assumption that the domain is complete, i.e. it contains all non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives, but his proof only requires the domain to contain all two-element subsets of the universal set. Evidently, the complete domain restriction implies, but is not implied by, the latter; which in turn is stronger than our domain restriction Î . See footnote 14 below. 
. This SCC satisfies NC, but violates WASRP. Thus, NC does not imply WASRP if -even when the universal set of alternatives is infinite. However, we do not know whether, given any arbitrary infinite
∉ˆX
, there necessarily exists a degenerate SCC satisfying NC but violating WASRP, for every possible Z outside the class .
We suspect this is so, but, since we have been unable so far to construct a general example for the infinite case, this remains an open question. The issue is analogously unresolved for infinite Î X with regard to non-degenerate SDCs defined over domains outside the class ℑ (recall Proposition 4.4).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a general choice context, where decision-makers may choose probabilistically among (possibly multi-element) subsets of a given feasible set of alternatives. We have modelled such choice behaviour in terms of an SCC with possibly incomplete domain, i.e., one which need not be defined over all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives. We have introduced a minimal consistency postulate, viz. contraction consistency, which restricts choice behaviour when the feasible set is contracted, as well as a generalized version of WARP. The first condition generalizes the condition of regularity in Nandeibam (2003) , while the second subsumes the version introduced in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) . Our substantive results identify the relationship between the two conditions. While the latter necessarily implies the former regardless of the domain of the SCC, the reverse relationship does not hold. We have identified a restriction on the domain of the SCC, under which the two consistency postulates turn out to be equivalent. This restriction includes a complete domain, while also permitting the domain to be incomplete. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, we have shown that this domain restriction constitutes a necessary, as well as sufficient, condition for contraction consistency to imply our generalized version of the weak axiom. We have also identified another domain restriction as both necessary and sufficient for the two conditions to be equivalent when one constrains SCCs to be degenerate, in addition to assuming the universal set to be finite. This condition suffices even when the universal set is infinite. Our results subsume the SCF-based analysis in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) within the more general environment of probabilistic multi-valued choice. Key results for the deterministic non-singleton choice environment, due to Sen (1971) , also turn out to be implied as special cases of our analysis.
The major thrust of our analysis lies in advancing our notion of contraction consistency as the foundational axiom for a general revealed preference approach to the theory of choice.
Considerations of plausibility, transparency and weak requirements would all appear to support its claim. This condition permits the immediate generalization of all earlier, restrictive analyses based on
Chernoff's Condition, the combination of Sen's α and β conditions, or regularity, to an expanded environment of probabilistic multi-element choice from possibly infinite feasible sets. Our analysis shows that one may utilize NC to achieve such a generalization even when some version of the weak axiom of revealed preference is necessary to generate significant empirical or predictive consequences. This is when the context of the theory makes it reasonable to assume that the SCC is defined over a domain sufficient for NC to imply WASRP. Our results characterize the general conditions under which this can be achieved; conditions which may be applied to specific theoretical contexts in future investigations. 15 Future work may also seek to identify domain restrictions under which NC suffices to imply rationalizability of the SCC in terms of probabilistic preference orderings. 
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We shall show that (N3) yields a contradiction, given NC. First notice that, by NC,
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In light of Lemma 4.8(ii), part (ii) of Proposition 4.10 follows directly from part (ii) of Proposition 5.4 in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) .
◊
